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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The legal literature on default rules studies which fall-back provi-
sions the law does or should prescribe if a contract fails to specify 
parties’ obligations fully in some contingency that arises. The “does” 
question is an empirical matter about which I have nothing to say. I 
will instead concentrate on the “should” question, specifically, on 
whether there is a theoretical rationale for so-called penalty default 
rules. 
 Since Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner’s 1989 Yale Law Journal ar-
ticle,1 penalty default rules—which intentionally specify outcomes 
that the contracting parties do not want—have attained some promi-
nence. Yet, I shall argue that Ayres and Gertner’s analysis of penalty 
defaults is flawed. These authors devise a model in which the justifi-
cation offered for a penalty default is to induce one contracting party 
to reveal socially valuable information that, with transaction costs, 
she would supposedly keep to herself under a “nonpenalty” default 
rule. But I will show that, given the authors’ assumption that the 
pertinent transaction cost is that of “contracting around the default 
rule,” the party in question has the incentive to divulge the critical 
information even under the nonpenalty rule. I conclude that the 
Ayres-Gertner rationale for penalty default is logically in error. (The 
same is not true in the alternative model of Lucian Bebchuk and Ste-
ven Shavell,2 for whom it is communication between parties that is 
assumed to be costly.) 
 In my discussion, I will limit attention, following Ayres and Gert-
ner, to private contracts between a buyer and a seller in a model 
based on the well-known case of Hadley v. Baxendale.3 Of course, the 
                                                                                                                      
 * This is a greatly revised version of my keynote address for the Symposium on De-
fault Rules in Private and Public Law, Florida State University College of Law, March 25, 
2005. 
 ** I thank Barry Adler, Jason Johnston, Eric Posner, Alan Schwartz, Steven Shavell, 
Steven Tadelis and Eric Talley for helpful comments and the NSF (Grant # SES-0318103) 
for research support. 
 1. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
 2. Lucian Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for 
Breach of Contract, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991). 
 3.  (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.). 
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issue of default rules potentially arises in many other settings too; 
for example, John Ferejohn and Barry Friedman argue that a politi-
cal constitution provides the default positions for legislation.4 But 
since my particular criticisms pertain to Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley 
setup, I will focus on that. 
II.   HADLEY V. BAXENDALE 
 Suppose that a buyer demands a service of a seller.5 Assume that 
the magnitude of the buyer’s prospective benefit from the service is 
B , but that B  is, at least at first, private information (that is, it is 
known to the buyer but not the seller). More specifically, suppose 
that, from the seller’s point of view, B  is either “normal” (that is, 
equal to some particular value NB )—and that the normal possibility 
occurs with probability q  (again, from the seller’s perspective)—or 
else, with probability q−1 , B  is “supernormal” (that is, 
NS BBB >= ). 
 Assume that, even if the seller agrees to provide the service, there 
is some risk that he will not succeed in doing so. This risk can be re-
duced (but not eliminated) by the seller’s taking “care.” If the seller 
incurs cost e of care (or effort), then )(eπ  is the probability of success-
ful provision, where π is an increasing function of e (the higher the 
seller’s expenditure on care, the higher the probability of success). 
 Like Ayres and Gertner,6 I will suppose that e  is not verifiable 
(that is, that there is no way to prove to a third party—for example, a 
court—what level of effort the seller has chosen), which implies that 
the level will be up to the seller to choose. But given e’s nonverifiabil-
ity, the question arises: How can the seller be induced to take proper 
care? After all, were provision to be unsuccessful, the seller could al-
ways claim that he took proper care and was just unlucky. One stan-
dard device from both theory and practice for inducing the right level 
of effort is to make the seller at least partially liable for the buyer’s 
lost benefit if provision fails. 
 But what if the contract neglects to specify the extent of the 
seller’s liability?  Most of the literature on Hadley has considered two 
possible liability rules as defaults. One is to make the seller liable for 
                                                                                                                      
 4. John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional De-
fault Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825 (2006). 
 5. In Hadley, a miller (the buyer) wished to have a carrier (the seller) transport a 
broken crankshaft so that it could be repaired. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 145. 
 6. Ayres and Gertner write that the “[seller’s] precaution decision cannot be con-
tracted upon because of the prohibitive costs of verifying the reliance investment.” Ian 
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Le-
gal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 767 (1992). 
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the buyer’s “normal” loss, NB in case provision fails (indeed, this is 
often called the “Hadley rule,” since in the original case the court 
awarded only normal damages). Because provision fails with prob-
ability )(eπ−1 , the seller’s net expected payoff under this rule is 
(1)  eeBp N −−− ))(( π1 ,7 
if the contract specifies a fixed price p for the service. (For conven-
ience, I suppose that the buyer pays the seller this price whether or 
not provision is successful.) Thus, if the contract is silent on liability, 
the seller will presumably choose e to maximize (1). I will denote this 
maximizing choice by Ne . 
 The other rule is to make the seller liable for the full loss B , 
whatever it turns out to be. The expected value of the loss is 
))(()())(( eBqeqB SN ππ −−+− 111 , and so, again assuming no liability 
provision in the contract and a fixed price p, the seller in this case 
will choose e to maximize the net payoff: 
(2)  eeBqeqBp SN −−−−−− ))(()())(( ππ 111 . 
 I will let *e  denote the maximizing choice in (2). Notice that, for 
this full-damages rule to be operational, there must be some way for 
a court to assess the magnitude of B. That is, even though we are as-
suming that B is private information ex ante, B must be verifiable ex 
post.8 
 For either liability rule, the corresponding choice of e above is 
generally  inefficient. For efficiency, the choice of e should be geared 
to the buyer’s actual loss B: the expected gross benefit from a par-
ticular choice of e is )(eBπ  and the cost is e. Hence, e should be cho-
sen to maximize 
(3)  eeB −)(π . 
 The choice of e maximizing (3) differs from *e and, if SBB = , also 
from Ne  (for SBB = , let the maximizing choice of e in (3) be Se ). 
 One way (but, as we will see, not the only way) parties can try to 
overcome these inefficiencies is to “override” or “contract around” the 
default in their contract. Indeed, Ayres and Gertner claim (correctly, 
in my view) that when the transaction costs of designing, writing and 
executing contracts are zero, both default liability rules lead to effi-
ciency.9 Therefore, as they do,10 let me introduce a strictly positive 
                                                                                                                      
 7. I suppose throughout that the seller is risk neutral. 
 8. Ayres and Gertner get at this point when they write: “We assume that it is cost-
less for the court to determine the valuations ex post, even though it is prohibitively ex-
pensive prior to a breach.” Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 770. 
 9. This is just a variant of the Coase Theorem. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 10. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 108. 
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fixed cost c of overriding the default rule; this cost might be thought 
of as the expense of drafting the efficient contractual provision that 
replaces the default. Ayres and Gertner claim that, with such a cost, 
it is quite possible that the normal-damages rule but not the full-
damages default will lead to efficiency. Because normal damages are 
not “consistent with what fully informed parties would have 
wanted”—if the seller knows the value of B, it is more efficient for 
him to be fully liable for its loss—they call the normal-damages rule 
a penalty default. Hence, they conclude that a penalty default may be 
desirable. I argue, however, that their claim is incorrect, that is, that, 
for the transaction cost and circumstances they consider, the full-
damages default will also generate efficiency. 
 First consider the normal-damages default rule. If not overridden, 
this rule will induce Nee = . Thus if NBB = , no overriding is needed 
to attain efficiency. Like Ayres and Gertner, I will suppose that the 
buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. Hence, when 
NBB = , price Np  will satisfy 
(4)  NNNN eeBp +−= ))(( π1 , 
provided the seller’s best alternative payoff is 0. 
 Assume next that SBB = —so that overriding is called for. To 
override the default, the buyer can announce that SBB = , and the 
contract can make the seller liable for that level of damages. In ex-
change, the price he receives will be  
(5)  SSSS eeBp +−= ))(( π1 . 
 Observe that the seller will agree to this contract because, as 
when NBB = , his payoff is zero. As for the buyer, note that as long as 
the inequality 
(6)
NSNNNNSNSSSSS
eBepBeBeceBecpB −=−−+≥−−=−− )())(()()( ππππ 1  
holds, she has the incentive to make the announcement and incur the 
cost c of overriding the default rule in the contract. That is, if (6) 
holds, we can expect an efficient outcome. 
 But Ayres and Gertner maintain that, even if (6) holds (so that the 
normal-damages rule leads to efficiency), the parties’ contract under 
the full-damages rule will quite possibly be inefficient.11 Recall that, 
if the seller does not know the value of B, then he will choose *ee =   
                                                                                                                      
 11. “Low-damage millers [normal-damage buyers] might fail to contract around a de-
fault that awarded unforeseeable [full] damage while high-damage millers [supernormal-
damage buyers] will contract around the Hadley [normal-damages] rule.” Ayres & Gertner, 
supra note 1, at 102. 
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and so will be willing to provide the service for the price 
(7)  **** ))()(())(( eBeqBeqp SN +−−+−= ππ 111 . 
 The Ayres-Gertner claim is that, under full-damages liability, the 
parties could well opt for a contract in which the seller is paid p∗  
and chooses *ee =  regardless of the buyer’s true B (that is, the con-
tract entails pooling), a clearly inefficient outcome. 
 To review the argument behind the claim, notice that if NBB = , 
the buyer could, in principle, attempt to improve efficiency by propos-
ing an alternative contract in which liability is limited to normal 
damages and the price is set at the lower level Np  rather than 
*p . 
However, if q is near enough 1, then the difference between *p  and 
Np  will be less than c, the cost of overriding the full-damages liabil-
ity rule. Thus, in that case, the buyer’s net gain from the alternative 
contract is negative, and so she will not propose it. Furthermore, if 
SBB = , then even when (6) holds, the buyer has a strong reason to 
hide the value of B: by revealing his potential damages, he will 
merely drive the price up to Sp without any compensating benefit 
(since under full-damages liability he gets SB  regardless of whether 
the service is actually provided). Hence, according to the argument, 
parties cannot avoid an inefficient pooling contract under full-
damages liability, when q is near enough 1. 
 But this logic overlooks a superior contract that the parties could 
agree to instead.  Notice that, even under the pooling contract, the 
seller would clearly profit from knowing the value of B, because he 
could then adjust e accordingly.  Indeed, with this information, he 
would still break even were the price reduced by some amount ∆ .  
Furthermore, the buyer would be perfectly happy to divulge the in-
formation, because, given full-damages liability, she would continue 
to get her full benefit B.  Hence, instead of the pooling contract, the 
parties would be better off signing a contract with the provisions that 
the seller is to be paid ∆−*p  and the buyer is to divulge the value of 
B.12 Clearly, this alternative contract attains efficiency (and Pareto 
dominates the pooling contract).  Moreover, it does not require over-
riding the (full-damages) default and therefore does not incur cost c.  
Thus, rational parties will presumably choose this alternative in 
preference to the pooling contract above, thereby generating an effi-
cient outcome. 
                                                                                                                      
 12. If NBB = , the buyer might contemplate getting an even better price, Np , by pro-
posing that the seller’s liability be limited to normal damages.  But notice that according to 
the Ayres-Gertner assumption, this would involve a prohibitive cost of overriding. 
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III.   CONCLUSION 
 Ayres and Gertner claim that a penalty default rule (normal-
damages liability) may be preferable in their buyer-seller model be-
cause it induces the buyer to reveal the magnitude of her damages—
thereby ensuring efficiency—in circumstances where the cost of over-
riding the default might interfere with her doing so under full-
damages liability. I have argued, however, that Ayres and Gertner 
have overlooked a better contract, which attains efficiency under full-
damages liability without the need for overriding. 
 This leads me to a broader point. Penalty default theory turns al-
most entirely on transaction costs: in the basic model, the choice of 
default rule is completely irrelevant without them. There are, of 
course, many different aspects of transactions that may be costly—
contract drafting, communication between parties, contractual com-
plexity, verification of damages, etc. Yet, as I have argued here, com-
paring default rules may depend critically on which particular costs 
(if any) are important. Unfortunately, empirical work has not ad-
vanced anywhere near the point where we have a good understand-
ing of the various costs’ absolute or relative magnitudes.  Thus, at 
present, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the theory, 
and so the normative exercise seems of rather limited value. 
